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ST. JOHN'S 1AW REVIEW
and were understood to confer no power of sale, but merely au-
thority to show diamonds to a customer and report to the owner.
There the Court thought that the words "on approval" necessitated
explanation. Without the words, the duty to return would have
been absolute. With them, the memorandum was ambiguous and
oral testimony was necessary to clarify the import of the instrument.3 1
While the line of demarcation between the cases is obscure, the
law evolved remains constant. The interpretation of the instru-
ment is of paramount importance. If it be clear and intelligible
on its face, the evidence of the custom and usage will be excluded.
But if the instrument is ambiguous, the ruling of Smith v. Clews 32
will apply, and the evidence will be admitted.
JOSEPH A. SCHIAVONE.
RECENT LIMITATION OF DOCTRINE OF LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
To THIRD PARTIES.
"General principles do not decide concrete cases." 1 In this
modern day of complex commercial relations it is equally evident
that not a small part of the judicial process deciding a specific case
is devoted to avoiding the effect of general principles in order to
leave the way open to decide the particular case in accordance with
the economic and commercial requirements of the particular situa-
tion.
The case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 2 recently de-
cided by the Court of Appeals, is significant as a limitation upon
the growing tendency to impose liability for negligence in favor of
parties not in a contractual relatiohship or other relation of privity
with the negligent party-a limitation prompted by expediency.
The public accounting firm of Touche, Niven and Company
was employed by the Stern Company to audit its books and prepare
a certified balance sheet for the year ending December 31, 1923, as
it had at the end of each of the preceding three years. The certi-
fied balance sheet ascribed to the Stern Company a net worth of
over $1,000,000., whereas, in fact, the company was insolvent. On
the strength of one of the 32 counterpart originals issued by the
defendant, audit company, the plaintiff to whom it was exhibited
made a series of loans to Stern Company. In the month preceding
the total collapse of the business in 1924, the plaintiff had advanced
"See Smith v. Clews, second appeal, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. 160 (1889).
' Supra note 29.
'Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U. S. 45 at 76, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 at 554 (1905), per
Holmes, J.
'255 N. Y. 170, 184 N. E. 441 (1931).
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over $165,000., most of it unsecured, and it is for the loss suffered
through these loans that the plaintiff sued the defendant.
The plaintiff's complaint was framed in negligence, a second
cause of action sounding in fraud, which was added on the trial,
having been dismissed without consideration by the jury.2 a That
there was negligence on the part of the defendant, the Court con-
cedes, and this is sustained by the evidence, but the question at bar is
the liability of this defendant to this plaintiff, who was not a party to
the contract of hiring nor in any direct relationship with the de-
fendant.
Analogous to the doctrine of beneficiary contracts 3 there has
been an increasing tendency in New York to give to third parties
an enforceable remedy against negligent actors. A manufacturer
who negligently produced an automobile so defective that its opera-
tion exposed the user to a serious risk 6f bodily harm has been held
liable to him for resulting injuries, although privity was entirely
lacking between them. 4  Other recent cases have reached a similar
result. 5 The instant case is distinguished on the ground that what
was there considered was a physical force, while here the Court is
"asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a
thought or a release of the explosive power resident in words." 6
While it was assumed by Pollock many years ago that "gen-
erally speaking, there is no such thing as liability for negligence in
word, as distinguished from act," and that "this difference is found-
ed in the nature of the thing," 7 much discussion has evolved about
the proposition. The case of Derry v. Peek,8 decided in 1889, in
which the English courts were said to have recognized this view,
was a case of fraud rather than negligence and what was said there
2a Plaintiff's cross-appeal from such dismissal successful, ibid.
The following observations of Chief Judge Cardozo in his opinion are
significant: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these
days apace. * * * In the field of the law of contract there has been a gradual
widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859) until today
the beneficiary of a promise, clearly indicated as such, is seldom left without
a remedy (Seaver v. Ranson, 224 N. Y. 233, 1918)." He further points out
that "something more must appear than an intention that the promise redound
to the benefit of the public or to that of a class of indefinite extension. The
promise must be such as to 'bespeak the assumption of a duty to make repar-
ation directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost'
(Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 164 (1928)," supra
note 2 at 180, 174 N. E. at 445.
'MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382. 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
'Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303, 48 Sup. Ct.
134 (1927); Chysky v. Drake, 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923); Pine
Grove Poultry Farm v. Newtown B. P. Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 162 N. E.
84 (1928).
'Supra note 2 at 181, 174 N. E. at 445.
'Pollock on Torts (8th ed., 1908), p. 553.
8 L. R. 14 A. C. 337 (1889). For an analysis of the case, and a discus-
sion of the problem see Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14
Harv. L. Rev. 184.
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on this point was merely obiter dictum. In New York, however,
three principal cases 9 have established the doctrine of liability for
negligent words and each of them might well be taken as authority
for the disposition of the present case.
The first of the cases is Glanzer v. Shepard,10 where the lia-
bility of the defendants-public weighers-was based upon their
legal duty to use care, as following a "common calling," although
the services rendered were given at the order of and for payment
by another, not the plaintiff. The distinction made between the
Shepard case and the case at bar is said to be not merely in the kind
of services rendered, but that the services rendered were for the
immediate benefit of a third party, who was "in effect, if not in
name, a party to the contract;" and the benefit was the primary ob-
ject of the transaction, and not, as in the instant case, collateral
to it. It is true that the Cotirt in Glanzer v. Shepard indicated that
the decision might have been based on the rule in Lawrence v.
Fox,0a and not in terms of legal duty. That the emphasis was
laid upon the latter is significant; that the opinions in both were
written by the same learned Judge, equally so.
Nor need the Court be at a loss for an even further extension
of the doctrine, to include not only a single party, but a class which
may enforce the liability we are here considering. In Doyle v.
Chatham & Phenix National Bank," decided by the same court only a
year ago, a member of a wholly indeterminate class-possible inves-
tors in a corporation, who relied on the negligent certification by the
bank that certain notes had been deposited with it as collateral for
the issuance of bonds-was allowed to recover. Yet the Court
here dismisses the case from consideration as totally indecisive be-
cause the investors, by the act of subscription to the bonds, had
become cestuis qui trustent.
Another case discussed at length by the Court in its review of
the ostensible authorities, is International Products Co. v. Erie
R. R. Co.12  While in one phase of the doctrine this case is in ad-
vance even of Glanzer v. Shepard 12a-that a negligent service need
'Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922) ; International
Products Co. v. Erie R. R. Co.. 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927); Doyle
v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930). For
a complete statement of the facts in each, see review of the opinion of the
Appellate Division in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche et al., supra note 2, in a
Note (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 76.
"0 Supra note 9. The defendants, public weighers, were requested by the
sellers of beans to make weight and furnish the buyers with a copy of the
return, on which payment was to be based. The weight was negligently com-
puted and the plaintiff buyer sued to recover the amount paid in excess of
value. The defendants were held liable.
a20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
"Supra note 9.
12 Ibid.
12a Supra note 9.
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not precede the negligent words on which liability is predicated-
it is still distinguished from it by the instant case. In the Erie
case, the relationship of bailor and bailee existed between the par-
ties, although the negligent information on which the action was
based was for the benefit of another. The distinction hinges on the
slim post of that relationship; because the defendant as bailor should
have known where the goods were to be stored, the case is said to
come within the class
"where a person within whose special province it lay to know
a particular fact, has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry
made with regard to it by a person desirous of ascertaining
the fact for the purpose of determining his course accord-
ingly, and has been held bound to make good the assurance
he has given." 13
These distinctions do not appeal to us as being particularly
meritorious. Surely the Shepard case lays down the rule that one
engaged in a public calling has the duty of care not only to his
immediate employer, but to a third party, who, he knows, will rely
on his report. It is said that certified public accountants "are
public only in the sense that their services are offered to any one
who chooses to employ them." 14 Is this the proper test? Then,
too, is the unskilled laborer, willing to work for any master who
will pay him, engaged in a "public calling." The public character
of duly licensed accountants must mean more; surely its scope is
as great as that of public weigher. Our attention is also directed
to the fact that the public weigher knew that his determination would
be relied upon by the plaintiff, and his report stated as much. It
can scarcely be doubted that the public accountants hired by the
Stern Company were as much aware that the certificates they issued
in duplicate would not be kept by their employer alone, but exhibited
to prospective lenders, and the Court admits as much.
The Doyle case, as we have indicated, extends the doctrine to
include liability to a large and unknown class. Are possible future
investors distinguishable from possible future lenders, if any dif-
ference can be found? Then, too, the Erie case is certainly author-
ity, as the Court itself here points out, for the proposition that
mere negligent words can result in a liability to third persons, aside
from acts-a liability sought to be imposed in the Touche case.
Thus we think it appears that these distinctions are more arbi-
trary than real. The justification for them lies in the necessity
for conformity to orthodox judicial process. The instant case was
decided purely on a sociological basis-this was a situation where
logic and symmetry must give way to expediency. The crux of
lf Herschell, L. C., in Dery v. Peek, supra note 13.
"Supra note 2 at 188, 174 N. E. at 448.
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the decision lies in two sentences which begin and end the relevant
discussion of our problem. Conceding the liability of accountants
for fraud, the Court says:
"If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the
cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a lia-
bility in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business con-
ducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty
that exposes to these consequences." 15
And, concluding the argument,
"We doubt whether the average business man receiving
a certificate without paying for it and receiving it merely
as one among a multitude of possible investors, would look
for anything more (than liability for fraud)." 16
Thus the Court takes judicial notice of a fact, in no way proved
or sought to be proved, and bases this important decision on it.17
What the expectations of honest business men are when they re-
ceive an accountant's audit of another's business, is a fact not
easily ascertainable perhaps, but still possible of discovery. We do
not attempt to decide whether the Court was correct in its as-
sumption of the prevalent belief among the class affected,' 8 nor is
that relevant to our discussion. The inevitable conclusion from an
analysis of the case is that had the Court believed the general ex-
pectations of the class seeking to impose this liability to be contrary
to the adopted theory, small effort would have been made to justify
the decision-the prior decisions which were so assiduously distin-
guished could even more easily be held as binding upon the Court.
We find support for our view in the writing of Chief Judge
Cardozo himself. 19 His own theory of law is that it shapes itself
to an end more important than its origin, through the instrumen-
tality chiefly of the sociological method. In approving this approach
to the goal, he says:
" Supra note 2 at 179, 174 N. E. at 444.
"' Supra note 2 at 189, 174 N. E. at 448.
' The brief on behalf of the American Institute of Accountants as ainicus
curiae undoubtedly influenced the Court in the view it adopted.
"8 Note (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 76, 80. It is there suggested that it
would not be an undue extension of the doctrine to hold accountants liable to a
greater degree of care than required by their contracts, for sociological rca-
sons, contra to the view of the present court.
" Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
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"The rule that functions well produces a title deed to
recognition. Only in determining how it functions we must
not view it too narrowly. We must not sacrifice the gen-
eral to the particular. We must not throw to the winds the
advantages of consistency and uniformity to do justice in
the instance. * * * But within the limits thus set, within a
range over which choice moves, the final principle of selec-
tion for judges * * * is one of fitness to an end." (Italics
ours.) 20
The end reached in the case of Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche, as we have said, was evidently the result of this method:
the duty of the Courts, as seen by Judge Cardozo, "to declare the
law in accordance with reason and justice" as "a phase of the duty
to declare it with custon." 21 The modern progressive tendency
towards liberalism and freedom from the old fetters of precedent
which so often stifle justice, is, wisely applied, highly desirable.
ESTHER L. KOPPELMAN.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY CHANGE IN
THE ADJECTIVE LAW.
While we are all familiar with such general statements that
"due process does not guarantee to a citizen of a state any particu-
lar form of procedure, its requirements are satisfied if the defen-
dant has had notice and an opportunity to be heard," ' yet at times
it is difficult to determine what constitutes notice or opportunity
to be heard. Generally speaking, this statement is true. The hear-
ing need not be a judicial proceeding, as the decision may be en-
trusted to an executive officer or administrative board.2 A state
may repeal a statute of limitation and thereby revive a debt that
had already been barred without violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3 A state may change the number of jurors in a criminal case
0Ibid. at 103.
21Ibid. at 106. (Italics ours.)
1Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362. 369, 50 Sup. Ct. 299 (1929).
2U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905).
'Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209 (1885): "No -man
promises to pay money with any view to being released from that obligation
by lapse of time. It violates no right of his, therefore when the legislature
says, time shall be no bar, though such was the law when the contract was
made. The authorities we have cited, especially in this Court, show that no
right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which has been lost. * * *
We can see no right which the promisor has in the law which permits him to
plead lapse of time instead of payment which shall prevent the legislature from
repealing the law."
